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Abstract
Named Data Networking (NDN) is a candidate next-generation Internet architecture designed to overcome the funda-
mental limitations of the current IP-based Internet, in particular strong security. The ubiquitous in-network caching
is a key NDN feature. However, pervasive caching strengthens security problems namely cache pollution attacks
including cache poisoning (i.e., introducing malicious content into caches as false-locality) and cache pollution (i.e.,
ruining the cache locality with new unpopular content as locality-disruption).
In this paper, a new cache replacement method based on Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) is pre-
sented to mitigate the cache pollution attacks in NDN. The ANFIS structure is built using the input data related to
the inherent characteristics of the cached content and the output related to the content type (i.e., healthy, locality-
disruption, and false-locality). The proposed method detects both false-locality and locality-disruption attacks as well
as a combination of the two on different topologies with high accuracy, and mitigates them efficiently without very
much computational cost as compared to the most common policies.
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1. Introduction
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) has recently
been considered as a promising architecture for the
next-generation Internet, shifting from sender-driven
end-to-end communication paradigm to receiver-driven
content retrieval paradigm [1, 2, 3]. This change from
host-centric to content-centric has several significant
advantages such as network load reduction, low dissem-
ination latency, scalability, etc. Additionally, strong se-
curity has been one of the main design requirements for
these architectures [4, 5, 6].
Named Data Networking (NDN) [7] is a prominent ex-
ample and ongoing research effort of CCN design. In
NDN, a consumer asks for a Content by sending an
Interest request towards the location of the content’s
origin where it has been published using name prefix
(content identifier) instead of today’s IP prefix (con-
tent location). The network can satisfy an Interest
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packet with a requested content from any intermedi-
ate node that holds a copy of the content in its cache
(Content Store). On the way back, -in reverse, the ex-
act path of the proceeding Interest- all the intermedi-
ate nodes store a copy of the content in their caches
to satisfy subsequent users interested in that content
(i.e., in-network caching) [8, 9, 10]. The ubiquitous
in-network caching is a key NDN feature as it reduces
overall latency and improves bandwidth utilization for
popular content [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. However, pervasive
caching strengthens the security problem of cache pol-
lution attacks in two generic classes: locality-disruption
and false-locality [16, 17, 18, 19]. Locality-disruption
attacks continuously generate requests for new unpopu-
lar files to force routers (i.e., the victims of the attack)
to cache unpopular content, thus degrading cache effi-
ciency by ruining the cache file locality. False-locality
attacks repeatedly request the same set of unpopular
(i.e., fake popular) files, thus degrading the hit ratio by
creating a false file locality at cache.
Cache replacement algorithms play an important role
in the analysis of cache pollution attacks [20, 21, 22].
Cache replacement refers to the process that a cache ca-
pacity becomes full and old content must be removed to
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make a space for new content. However, the most re-
placement algorithms and policies are susceptible to a
subclass of pollution attacks [21, 22]. These algorithms
and policies consider just one criterion and ignore other
criteria that may influence on the caching efficiency and
suffer from cache pollution attacks [23, 24, 25]. In
this paper, a new cache replacement method in NDN
is developed to detect and mitigate these two types of
cache pollution attacks. The proposed method is based
on the relationship between inherent characteristics of
the cached content and the content type (i.e., attack or
non-attack). Many researchers have proposed mean-
ingful relationship between a series of nonlinear input-
output data patterns using Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy In-
ference System (ANFIS) [26, 27, 28, 29]. ANFIS is
a beneficial method to handle linguistic concepts and
find nonlinear relationships between inputs and out-
puts, which is a combination of the strength of Artifi-
cial Neural Network (ANN) and fuzzy systems [30, 31].
In ANFIS, neural networks extract automatically fuzzy
rules from numerical data through the learning process,
and the membership functions are adaptively adjusted.
The whole proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement
method contains three steps: the input-output data pat-
terns are extracted from the NDN scenarios at first. The
input features are the inherent characteristics and statis-
tical data of the cached content, and the output is the
numerical value which refer to the type of the content,
i.e., locality-disruption, false-locality or healthy. After
that, the accuracy of constructed ANFIS is verified un-
der different cache pollution circumstances. And finally,
the constructed model is established in a simulation en-
vironment to be integrated with NDN topologies as a
novel cache replacement method to mitigate cache pol-
lution attacks in a timely manner.
The main objective of the proposed method is to enable
the caching efficiency through a novel nonlinear cache
replacement method in the presence of the cache pollu-
tion attacks and satisfy some applied performance met-
rics. The evaluation through simulations shows that the
proposed nonlinear cache replacement method based on
ANFIS provides benefits in cache robustness and mit-
igating cache pollution attacks with high accuracy in
a timely manner. We then illustrate that the proposed
method provides a suitable compromise between over-
head and applied performance metrics as compared to
some common existing countermeasures.
The reminder of this paper is constructed as follows. In
Section 2, a short overview of NDN is presented. Sec-
tion 3 presents previous works on cache pollution at-
tacks and countermeasures in NDN. ANFIS architecture
is outlined in Section 4. The proposed ANFIS-based
cache replacement method for mitigating cache pollu-
tion attacks is introduced in Section 5. Experimental
setup, observations and results of the proposed method
are studied in detail in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. At
last, the conclusion is given in Section 8.
2. NDN overview
All communication in NDN is performed using two
types of packets: Interest and Content (Data). Both
types of packets carry a name, which uniquely identifies
a piece of data that can be carried in one data packet [7].
Data names in NDN are hierarchically structured, e.g.,
seven fragment of a YouTube video would be named
/youtube/videos/B87Rdx9s2/7. Each NDN node
maintains three major data structures: Content Store,
Pending Interest Table (PIT), and Forwarding Informa-
tion Base (FIB). To retrieve a content, a consumer sends
an Interest packet using name prefix instead of today’s
IP prefix towards the location of the content’s origin
where it has been published. When a NDN router re-
ceives an Interest packet, it first checks its content store
(i.e., temporary cache of Data packets for data retrieval
efficiency). If there is no the requested content, the PIT
table records the Interest’s name, incoming interface(s),
and outgoing interface(s) and then forwards the Inter-
est packet using its FIB towards potential data sources.
The PIT table holds all not yet satisfied Interest packets.
The FIB is a name-prefix-based routing table to deter-
mine interfaces for forwarding incoming Interest pack-
ets based on the forwarding strategies. When an Inter-
est packet is satisfied, on the reverse path of Interest, all
the intermediate nodes remove the corresponding PIT
table entry and cache the content in their content store
to answer to probable same Interest requests from sub-
sequent consumers [4, 32].
3. Related work
As a new Internet architecture proposal, there is very
limited work recently regarding to mitigation of cache
pollution attacks in NDN. Park et al. [18] propose a de-
tection approach against locality disruption attacks us-
ing randomness checks of a matrix in CCN. They apply
a filtering approach and a statistical sequential analy-
sis (i.e., cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm) to de-
tect low-rate attacks. Since the analysis is based on a
very simple CCN scenario, the results cannot be ex-
tented to a larger CCN topology. Conti et al. [20] in-
troduce a lightweight detection technique for detecting
locality-disruption attacks. However, authors do not ap-
ply any reaction method for mitigating attacks. Xie et
2
al. [17] introduce a technique, called CacheShield with
the goal of improving NDN cache robustness against lo-
cality disruption attacks. In CacheShield, when a router
receives a content object, the CS evaluates a shield-
ing function based on a logistic function that deter-
mines whether the content object should be cached. The
CacheShield must run continuously even when no at-
tack is in progress and store a large amount of statis-
tics at each router that may reduce the space available
to cache content. Paper [20] shows that CacheShield
is ineffective against some pollution attacks and intro-
duces new attacks specific to CacheShield. Ghali et al.
[19] propose a ranking algorithm for cached content that
allows routers to probabilistically distinguish good and
bad content. This ranking is based on statistics collected
from consumers’ actions following delivery of content
objects. Authors evaluate the performance of their rank-
ing algorithm with inactive adversaries. They also as-
sume that any fake content has a valid version till the
proposed algorithm detects fake versions. The ranking
algorithm must store several versions of the same con-
tent to detect a valid version, and therefore consume
routers’ storage and computing resources such as FIB
for returning back the different possible versions of a
same content.
Figure 1: ANFIS architecture with two inputs and nine
rules
4. ANFIS
ANFIS is a class of adaptive networks whose func-
tionality is equivalent to a fuzzy inference system which
generates a fuzzy rule base and membership functions
automatically [33]. ANFIS is an integration of neural
network architectures with fuzzy inference system (FIS)
to map a couple of inputs-output data patterns. An AN-
FIS constructs a FIS (if-then rules) whose membership
function parameters are adjusted using either backprop-
agation algorithm or in combination with a least squares
type of method [34, 35]. An ANFIS architecture con-
sists of a fuzzy layer, product layer, normalized layer,
defuzzy layer, and summation layer. A typical archi-
tecture of ANFIS with two inputs (x and y), nine rules
and one output ( f ) is depicted in Fig. 11. Among many
FIS models, the 1st order Sugeno fuzzy model is the
most widely applied adaptive technique with high in-
terpretability and computational efficiency for different
problems [28, 34]. For a 1st order of Sugeno fuzzy
model, a typical rule set with two fuzzy if-then rules
can be expressed as:
i f x is A1 and y is B1 then f1 = p1x + q1y + r1 (1)
i f x is A2 and y is B2 then f2 = p2x + q2y + r2 (2)
where Ai and Bi are the fuzzy sets in the antecedent and
pi, qi, and ri are the linear output parameters that are
determined during the training process. As in Fig. 1, an
ANFIS consists of five layers and nine if-then rules as
follows:
Layer-1: all the square nodes in this layer are adaptive
nodes. The outputs of layer 1 are the fuzzy membership
grade of the inputs, which are given by:
O1,i = µAi(x), f or i = 1, 2, 3 O1,i = µBi−3(y), f or i = 4, 5, 6
(3)
where x and y are inputs to node i, and Ai and Bi are
linguistic labels for inputs. O1,i is the membership func-
tion of Ai and Bi. µAi(x) and µBi−3(y) can adopt any
fuzzy membership function. For instance, if a Gaussian
membership function is employed:
µAi(x) , µBi−3(y) = exp
[
−( x − ci
ai
)2
]
(4)
where ci and ai are the parameter set of the membership
function. These parameters in this layer are referred to
a premise parameters.
Layer-2: Every node in this layer is a fixed node with a
1Reprinted from Expert Systems with Applications, Vol 37/12,
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circle node label
∏
which multiplies the incoming sig-
nals and sends the product out. The output of this layer
can be represented as:
O2,i = wi = µAi(x) × µBi−3(y), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 9 (5)
Each node output represents the firing strength of a rule.
Layer-3: Every node in this layer is also a fixed circle
node labeled N, indicating that they play a normaliza-
tion role to the firing strengths from the previous layer.
The outputs of this layer can be represented as:
O3,i = w¯i =
wi
(w1 + w2 + ... + w9)
, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 9 (6)
Layer-4: In this layer, the square nodes are adaptive
nodes. The output of each node in this layer is the
product of the normalized firing strength and a 1st or-
der polynomial (for a 1st order Sugeno model):
O4,i = w¯i . fi = wi . (pix+qiy+ri), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 9 (7)
where wi is the output of layer 3 and three parameters
{pi, qi, ri} are the parameter set which will be referred
to as consequent parameters.
Layer-5: The single node in this layer is a circle node
labeled
∑
(overall output) that performs the summation
of all incoming signals:
O5,i = f =
∑
i
w¯i fi =
∑
i wi fi∑
i wi
(8)
ANFIS has a hybrid learning rule algorithm which in-
tegrates the gradient descent and the least squares meth-
ods to train and adjust the premise and consequent pa-
rameters [36]. The hybrid learning algorithm is com-
posed of a forward pass and a backward pass. The
least squares method (forward pass) is used to optimize
the consequent parameters with the premise parameters
fixed to minimize the measured error in layer 4. In the
backward pass, the premise parameters are updated by
the gradient descent method [33, 36].
5. An ANFIS-based cache replacement method for
mitigating cache pollution attacks
In this section, we design and construct the material
of proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement method
for mitigating cache pollution attacks in NDN. After-
wards, we use simulation to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed method in two considered NDN topolo-
gies in Fig. 3. The proposed ANFIS-based cache re-
placement architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. The detail
of the method is proposed as follows.
5.1. Data preparation
The detection of cache pollution attacks is hard be-
cause all requested content are uncorrupted. The tra-
ditional detection methods usually observe and learn
the legitimate users’ traffic patterns and detect attacks
and anomalies when such patterns change. To address
this challenge, we analyze the inherent characteristics
of cache pollution attacks and design a nonlinear ap-
proximation function through ANFIS to detect locality-
disruption and false-locality attacks separately. In order
to formulate the problem and construct an ideal method
regarding the relationship between inputs (i.e., inherent
characteristics of cached content) and output (i.e., con-
tent type) data, we define a set of parameters that govern
the proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement method.
We extract the input parameters based on published re-
search articles such as [19, 37, 38], our observation dur-
ing the design, and experts’ opinion. The considered
input parameters are defined as follows:
1. The cached content’s longevity (Longevity). This
corresponds to the time that content has remained
in the cache between the time of content being
cached and the current time.
2. The cached content’s frequency access (Fre-
quency). This corresponds to the estimation of
content’s access frequency. An Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) method is
employed as a filter to obtain a recent estimate
of the access frequency rate. It can also iden-
tify the possible aberrant behavior of content’s ac-
cess frequency. EWMA applies weighting fac-
tors which decrease exponentially. The weighting
for each older data decreases exponentially, giv-
ing much more importance to recent observations
while still not discarding older observations en-
tirely [39]. The degree of weighting decrease is
expressed as a constant smoothing factor β, a num-
ber between 0 and 1. EWMA formula is defined
as:
µn = βµn−1 + (1 − β)xn (9)
where µn is the exponentially weighted moving av-
erage of the past measurements and xn is the num-
ber of content’s access frequency in the n-th time
interval. We apply the six recent time intervals
(i.e., each 0.25 second) to calculate EWMA effi-
ciently.
3. The Standard Deviation of content’s access fre-
quency in recent six time intervals (Std.). This pa-
rameter allows to distinguish the type of content
4
Figure 2: Schematic of the proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement method in NDN
(a) XC topology
(b) DFN topology
Figure 3: Considered network topologies
request distribution. The Std. of an uniform distri-
bution is (close to) zero, while other types of dis-
tribution such as normal and skewed are not (close
to) zero.
4. The last access to the content (Last Retrieval). It
corresponds to the time interval between the last
time of content being used and the current time.
5. The percentage of cache hit (Hit Ratio). It corre-
sponds to the content cache hit vs. the total content
cache hit in the recent time interval.
6. The variance of an entire population of repeated re-
quests for a same content from the local interfaces
(Interface turnout). The variance allows to detect
distributed cache pollution attacks, when all local
interfaces return the same content continuously. If
all local interfaces return the similar rate of con-
tent, the variance is close to zero.
The output of each data pattern is a goodness value
which determines the type of content ranging [0..1]. The
boundary of assigned goodness value is defined as: 0
(false-locality or fake content), 0.5 (locality-disruption
or new unpopular content), and 1 (healthy). We apply
EWMA criterion in the last three time intervals to cal-
culate the average goodness value for each content over
a period of time.
According to Fig. 2, the applied ANFIS model is auto-
matically executed after every time interval (we set it to
1 second) over cached content with longevity more than
a threshold (we set 0.25 second) in order to rank all con-
tent based on the goodness value. The initial goodness
value for new incoming content with the longevity less
than the threshold is set to one (healthy content). Af-
ter running ANFIS, each content gets a goodness value
from the healthy (good) to fake (bad). Those content
with the goodness value less than a predefined thresh-
old (we set θ < 0.2) are removed from the cache due to
their fake type. This allows to possible valid (healthy)
content be replaced with the fake version. Then, the re-
5
maining content is sorted in ascending order based on
the goodness value for cache replacement when a new
content enters and the cache has not enough space for
storing. Thus, the proposed method can efficiently and
accurately mitigate the false-locality (by removing the
fake content) and the locality-disruption (by removing
those content with the lower goodness value for cache
replacement) attacks in a timely manner.
5.2. Materials of ANFIS
During the training process, ANFIS tries to minimize
the training error between the target output (i.e., the type
of cached content) and the actual output of the ANFIS.
The input-output data samples are collected based on
the section 5.1. In particular, we set cache size to in-
finite to not to apply any cache replacement algorithm
during the training process (see section 6).
In this work, ANFIS is established in MATLAB envi-
ronment. The ANFIS has 6 inputs and one output. Be-
fore the training process, data samples should be nor-
malized into [0..1], when dealing with parameters of
different units and scales [40, 41]. All variables of AN-
FIS have ”gaussmf” membership function. The gaussmf
is a kind of smooth membership functions, so the result-
ing model has a high accuracy [42]. The ”and”, ”or”
and ”defuzzification” methods in ANFIS are selected as
”product”, ”max” and ”center of gravity”, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the structure of the constructed ANFIS
model as well as the number of fuzzy if-then rules. Be-
fore training process, the ANFIS structure is initialized
by the fuzzy c-mean method through the input-output
data, and its parameters are optimized by least squares
and gradient descent algorithms.
6. Experimental setup
This section describes the considered network topolo-
gies, simulation environment, followed by the modeling
of cache pollution attack strategies.
6.1. Simulation environment
We evaluate cache pollution attacks and countermea-
sures discussed in this paper via simulations. We rely
on open-source ndnSIM [43] package, a module for ns-
3 developed at UCLA as part of the NDN project. The
ANFIS-based cache replacement method was firstly im-
plemented with MATLAB on an Intel Pentium 4 3.0
GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM running Windows 7 Ultimate.
Then, it was compiled as a C++ shared library using
the MATLAB compiler in order to integrated it with the
ndnSIM environment.
The Experiments are performed over two topologies,
as illustrated in Fig. 32: Xie-complex (XC) and the
German Research Network (DFN). The XC and DFN
topologies have been identified in previous works as
meaningful topologies for simulation [20, 44]. There
are several commonly used symbols to identify the type
of nodes in NDN networks (such as Fig. 3), including
Cx, Px, Rx, and Ax to represent x-th consumer, producer,
router and adversary nodes, respectively [20, 32]. In our
configurations, we set nodes’ PIT size to [500..800] en-
tries randomly. The Interest expiration time was also set
to the default timeout of 4000 ms. We set the link delay
and queue length parameters to fixed values for every
node. In particular, we set delay and queue length to 10
ms and 500, respectively. The requests of regular con-
sumers (we call them honest consumers) follow a three
types of pattern: Zipf-like, exponentially and batch (i.e.,
generating a specified number of Interests at specified
points of simulation) distributions [43]. We also con-
figure the pattern frequency of Interest packets ranging
[100..800], where each honest consumer changes five
times the frequency randomly. We apply randomly two
different replacement policies in PIT table (i.e., perform
different actions when limit on number of PIT entries
is reached) including LRU and persistent policies. The
nodes’ cache capacity was randomly set to [100..400]
content. We set the low and medium size for cache
capacity to evaluate the accuracy and robustness of the
proposed ANFIS-based method sufficiently.
The simulation runs over two and a half hours. The
collected input-output data pattern during the simula-
tion is divided into three blocks as training (70%) to
fit (train) the ANFIS model, the first testing (15%) and
the second testing (remaining last 15%) to confirm the
ANFIS accuracy after training. During the simulation,
honest consumers request content based on the above-
mentioned configurations. False-locality (see section
6.2) and locality-disruption (see section 6.3) attacks are
issued by adversaries between 0s-30s and 50s-80s, re-
spectively. Finally, the last thirty seconds between 100s-
130s, adversaries launch both attacks at the same time to
measure the effect of the proposed ANFIS-based cache
replacement method in the simultaneous presence of the
both attacks.
6.2. False-locality
We consider two types of content poisoning imple-
mentation: proactive and active attacks. Firstly, we con-
2Reprinted from Computer Networks, Vol 57/16, Mauro Conti,
Paolo Gasti and Marco Teoli, A lightweight mechanism for detection
of cache pollution attacks in Named Data Networking, pages 3178-
3191, Copyright (2013), with permission from Elsevier
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Figure 4: The structure of the proposed ANFIS
(a) Longevity (b) Frequency (c) Std.
(d) Last retrieval (e) Hit ratio (f) Interface Turnout
Figure 5: Final membership functions of the input data
sider a proactive content poisoning attack whereby ad-
versaries anticipated a set of Interest packets for a set
of valid content. Adversaries inject fake content into
router caches. Assuming a consumer sends an Interest
packet which is received by an intermediate router (Ri)
and an entry is added to its PIT table. When a router or
producer satisfies the Interest packet with a fake content
and returns back to the Ri, all the intermediate nodes in
the way back as well as Ri are polluted with a fake con-
tent. A range of honest consumers are not satisfied if
an Interest returns a fake content. After receiving a fake
content, they always send the same Interest packet until
receive valid content. A range of adversaries behave in
the opposite manner. They always ask for bogus con-
tent. The adversaries request content according to the
uniform distribution. Secondly, we consider an active
content poisoning attack whereby adversaries ask some
fake content during the simulation run.
We use simulation to measure how many honest con-
sumers can retrieve healthy (valid) content and how fast
they can do so when the router caches are poisoned. For
proactive scenarios, all routers are pre-populated with
different rate of fake content objects, 50%, 80%, and
95% of all the content when the simulation runs. In ac-
tive scenarios, adversaries request a series of fake con-
tent in which intermediate routers are populated with
fake content ranging 30%, 50%, and 70% of all the con-
tent. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme outper-
forms the most common policies as Least Frequently
Used (LFU) and Least Recently Used (LRU) algorithms
in terms of applied performance criteria.
6.3. Locality-disruption
We assume that the adversaries can predict Interest
packets from a set of honest consumers to issue Interests
for attack purposes. The adversaries can issue Interest
packets with 5%, 50%, and 90% of the total number of
Interest packets issued by honest consumers according
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to the uniform distribution. This allows to explore the
effects of low, moderate and high attacks, and whether
the proposed ANFIS-based countermeasure is able to
identify and mitigate them.
To summarize multiple statistics in the absence and
presence of attacks, we define the metric similar to Deng
et al. [22] as the key measure of the effectiveness of the
attack as:
Hit damage ratio = 1−HR(non − attack) − HR(attack)
HR(non − attack)
(10)
Where, HR(non − attack) and HR(attack) denote the
hit ratio of honest consumers in the absence/presence
of an attack, respectively. When the Hit damage ratio
is (close to) zero, the attack is completely ineffective,
while it is (close to) one, the caching feature is com-
pletely under attack. We then demonstrate that the pro-
posed scheme outperforms the most common policies
as LFU, LRU independently and in conjunction with
CacheShield [17] in terms of applied performance crite-
ria. Xie et al. in [17] introduce CacheShield, a method
to shield NDN routers from locality disruption attacks.
7. Experimental results
In this section, we demonstrate through simula-
tions that the proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement
method satisfies in a much better way the applied perfor-
mance criteria as compared to the preexisting methods.
Our countermeasure is tested over the two considered
topologies in Fig. 3. Each router implements the pro-
posed ANFIS-based technique discussed in Section 5.
7.1. Results of ANFIS design
The training data used for constructing ANFIS model
is the obtained statistical data (see section 6) from DFN
topology. The constructed ANFIS model is used as
a cache replacement method over both XC and DFN
topologies in order to test its performance and robust-
ness against cache pollution attacks.
Based on the hybrid training process in ANFIS
through the number of constructed cluster centers by
fuzzy c-mean clustering, there are seven fuzzy rules.
The number of training epochs is 500 and the error tol-
erance was set to the default value, which is zero. The
initial step-size and the increase and decrease rates were
set to 0.01, 0.8, and 1.2, respectively. These configura-
tion settings in our application are set up to cover a wide
range of learning tasks, which lead to optimization of
the training process. Fig. 5 illustrates the final member-
ship functions of input data. To show the efficiency of
Figure 6: The statistical results on training data set
Figure 7: The statistical results on 1st testing data set
Figure 8: The statistical results on 2nd testing data set
the model, different performance metrics are applied in-
cluding Mean Square Error (MSE), Mean Absolute Er-
ror (MAE), Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Standard
Deviation of the error (Std.), and Quantile-Quantile plot
(Q-Q plot) followed by Pearson and Kendall tau b cor-
relation coefficient divided to training and testing data
sets. Numerical results are shown in Figs. 6-9. The
plots demonstrate the correspondence between the real
values (content type) and corresponding output values
predicted by the ANFIS model, indicating that the AN-
FIS model we have developed is accurate.
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(a) Numerical results on training set (b) Numerical results on 1st testing set (c) Numerical results on 2nd testing set
Figure 9: Q-Q plot and statistical results
(a) 50% pre-populated (b) 80% pre-populated (c) 95% pre-populated
Figure 10: Results of different pre-populated fake content in XC topology (mean of 10 runs)
(a) 50% pre-populated (b) 80% pre-populated (c) 95% pre-populated
Figure 11: Results of different pre-populated fake content in DFN topology (mean of 10 runs)
7.2. Mitigating false-locality
We first evaluate the effectiveness of proposed
ANFIS-based cache replacement method in a simple
network topology using the XC network. Fig. 10 illus-
trates the average behavior of three methods with differ-
ent pre-populated fake content rate within 10 runs. The
proposed ANFIS-based cache replacement method is
more accurate and outperforms other methods in terms
of the faster full convergence.
After verifying the correct behavior of ANFIS-based
cache replacement method in the XC topology, we con-
sider a more complex network topology using DFN net-
work in Fig. 11. Fig. 11 shows the average of exper-
imental results by ANFIS-based, LRU, and LFU cache
replacement methods within 10 runs. As shown in this
figure, there is a considerable benefits of the proposed
countermeasure implemented by ANFIS model in faster
full convergence of the honest consumers. With in-
creased rate of pre-populated fake content, the LRU and
LFU methods perform an insignificant behavior in re-
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(a) 5% locality-disruption (b) 50% locality-disruption (c) 90% locality-disruption
Figure 12: Results of Hit damage ratio for locality-disruption attack in XC topology (mean of 10 runs)
moving the fake content from the caches. Whereas,
the proposed ANFIS-based method performs more ac-
curate and efficient in removing the fake content from
the caches and satisfies all the honest consumers in a
timely manner.
7.3. Mitigating locality-disruption
Simulation results in Figs. 12 and 13 show that
our cache replacement technique can quickly detect the
content placed with the goal of performing locality-
disruption attacks and replace them when a new content
is added to a full cache. These figures show that routers
using ANFIS-based cache replacement method success-
fully outperforms four applied cache replacement algo-
rithms in a timely manner. The most stunning result is
the extreme vulnerability of the LRU and the LFU to
pollution attacks.
The experimental results in Figs. 12a-12c and 13a-
13c indicate that the ANFIS-based cache replacement
technique is more resilient than the preexisting methods
against locality-disruption attacks. Despite the fact that
the hit damage ratio is still quite high by ANFIS-based
technique in the early times of the simulation, the appli-
cation of the ANFIS-based technique is quite effective
and more reliable against low, middle, and high rate pol-
lution attacks.
7.4. Mitigating combination of both attacks at the same
time
Adversaries can launch both false-locality and
locality-disruption attacks at the same time. For in-
stance, the same set of attackers can launch false-
locality attacks by pre-populating 50% of the total hon-
est consumers’ Interest requests, and at the same time
they start locality-disruption attacks to interfere the con-
tent locality by requesting the rest 50% of the honest
consumers’ Interest requests in the caches.
According to the proposed ANFIS-based cache replace-
ment method discussed in section 5, the existence of
locality-disruption attacks will not affect the detection
of false-locality attacks and vise versa. First, the pro-
posed method tries to detect false-locality attacks by
assigning goodness value close to zero, and once de-
tected, they are removed from the caches. Then those
content with the goodness value close to 0.5, detected
as locality-disruption attacks, would be replaced sep-
arately when a new content enters and cache space is
full.
We vary the behavior of attackers for executing false-
locality and locality-disruption attacks between 100 and
130 seconds of the simulation run. Figs. 14-16 and
17-19 are shown the results of mitigating both cache
pollution attacks at the same time with different strate-
gies in XC and DFN topologies, respectively. Experi-
mental results demonstrate that our proposed method is
more resilient and more accurate than preexisting meth-
ods to the mixture of attacks. The most stunning result
is the extreme vulnerability of the LRU and LFU algo-
rithms to the active false-locality attacks as compared to
the proactive false-locality attacks. Thus, the proposed
ANFIS-based cache replacement mechanism in the con-
sidered simulation environments offers visibly promis-
ing performance in presence of cache pollution attacks.
7.5. The overhead cost
In this section, we assess the overhead cost of our
proposed method and preexisting schemes in presence
of adversaries. In particular, we are interested in deter-
mining the overhead of the average number of arrival
data packets for legitimate users in routers and the op-
eration overhead of the methods.
1. The overhead of the average of arrival data pack-
ets: It guarantees that this amount of data packet was
actually transferred over the channel during the cache
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(a) 5% locality-disruption (b) 50% locality-disruption (c) 90% locality-disruption
Figure 13: Results of Hit damage ratio for locality-disruption attack in DFN topology (mean of 10 runs)
(a) Receiving valid content by 30% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 70% locality-disruption
Figure 14: The results for 30% false-locality and 70% locality-disruption in XC topology (mean of 10 runs)
(a) Receiving valid content by 50% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 50% locality-disruption
Figure 15: The results for 50% false-locality and 50% locality-disruption in XC topology (mean of 10 runs)
pollution attacks. Figs. 20 and 21 show the average of
overhead of transmitted data packets in routers in the
XC and DFN networks, respectively. We can observe
that the our proposed method outperforms other meth-
ods based on the lower overhead of data transmission.
Our results confirm that the most data packets were able
to cache to the closest edge routers (i.e., close routers to
the legitimate consumers) by mitigating effectively both
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(a) Receiving valid content by 70% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 30% locality-disruption
Figure 16: The results for 70% false-locality and 30% locality-disruption in XC topology (mean of 10 runs)
(a) Receiving valid content by 30% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 70% locality-disruption
Figure 17: The results for 30% false-locality and 70% locality-disruption in DFN topology (mean of 10 runs)
(a) Receiving valid content by 50% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 50% locality-disruption
Figure 18: The results for 50% false-locality and 50% locality-disruption in DFN topology (mean of 10 runs)
attacks. Our results also show that the overhead of trans-
mitting data packets by LRU and LFU algorithms are
greater than our proposed method and the CacheShield,
making the attack more effective.
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(a) Receiving valid content by 70% false-locality (b) The hit damage ratio by 30% locality-disruption
Figure 19: The results for 70% false-locality and 30% locality-disruption in DFN topology (mean of 10 runs)
Figure 20: The average of arrival data packets in XC topology
2. The operation overhead: This is the amount of pro-
cessing time to execute the caching algorithms within
operating system. Table 1 shows that the proposed
method seems to be less time consuming than the other
methods except LRU and LFU algorithms when attacks
do not run simultaneously. The results in Table 1 in-
dicate that the proposed approach can improve the per-
formance as compared to LRU and LFU algorithms in
terms of the operation overhead up to 3.93% and 2.15
%, and 4.15% and 3.78% in XC and DFN topologies
respectively, when both cache pollution attacks are si-
multaneously implemented. According to the obtained
results, by increasing rate of attacks, the overhead of
our proposed method is considerably decreased as com-
pared to LRU and LFU. The results from Table 1 also
confirm that the our proposed method outperforms suf-
ficiently the CacheShield-LRU and CacheShield-LFU
methods in terms of the operation overhead up to
11.56% and 13.79%, and 18.67% and 20.14% in XC
and DFN, respectively.
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the pro-
posed method, we illustrate that the proposed ANFIS-
based method provides a suitable compromise between
overhead (i.e., the overhead of the arrival data packets
in Figs. 20 and 21, and the operation overhead of the
algorithms in Table 1) and applied performance met-
rics including the percentage of legitimate consumers
receiving valid content (Figs. 10-11 and 14a-19a) and
the hit damage ratio (Figs. 12-13 and 14b-19b) as com-
pared to common existing countermeasures. Therefore,
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Figure 21: The average of arrival data packets in DFN topology
Table 1: Comparing operation overhead achieved by the proposed scheme over other methods (mean of 10 runs)
Time (sec) Attack Percent of worsening (↓) and improving (↑) (%)
LRU LFU CacheShield-LRU CacheShield-LFU
XC topology:
0-50 (false-locality attacks)
50% ↓ 8.83 ↓ 7.98 - -
80% ↓ 7.11 ↓ 4.36 - -
95% ↓ 5.32 ↓ 2.81 - -
50-100 (locality-disruption attacks)
5% ↓ 8.62 ↓ 7.37 ↑ 11.41 ↑ 11.51
50% ↓ 8.47 ↓ 6.29 ↑ 10.11 ↑ 11.24
90% ↓ 6.83 ↓ 3.98 ↑ 11.28 ↑ 12.76
100-150 (combination of both attacks)
30-70% ↑ 1.74 ↑ 1.31 ↑ 10.18 ↑ 13.07
50-50% ↑ 2.59 ↑ 1.64 ↑ 11.56 ↑ 12.34
70-30% ↑ 3.93 ↑ 2.15 ↑ 11.01 ↑ 13.79
DFN topology:
0-50 (false-locality attacks)
50% ↓ 9.52 ↓ 7.45 - -
80% ↓ 8.17 ↓ 6.43 - -
95% ↓ 8.03 ↓ 5.14 - -
50-100 (locality-disruption attacks)
5% ↓ 9.21 ↓ 9.33 ↑ 16.73 ↑ 15.33
50% ↓ 9.01 ↓ 7.75 ↑ 17.11 ↑ 16.03
90% ↓ 6.83 ↓ 7.24 ↑ 15.91 ↑ 17.76
100-150 (combination of both attacks)
30-70% ↑ 1.42 ↑ 1.66 ↑ 17.34 ↑ 20.02
50-50% ↑ 2.84 ↑ 2.03 ↑ 17.13 ↑ 19.38
70-30% ↑ 4.15 ↑ 3.78 ↑ 18.67 ↑ 20.14
the extensive analysis satisfies the objectives of the ex-
periment in terms of the applied performance metric and
ensure that the proposed ANFIS-based caching for mit-
igating cache pollution attacks in NDN can yield high
accuracy as compared to other methods without very
much computational cost.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel ANFIS-based
cache replacement method to mitigate two generic
cache pollution attacks namely false-locality and
locality-disruption in NDN. Simulation results showed
that the proposed method provides very accurate results
as compared to LRU and LFU algorithms independently
and in conjunction with CacheShield scheme. Experi-
mental results and analysis show the proposed ANFIS-
based cache replacement method is very effective in de-
termining and mitigating the fake content, and has a
very high detection rate of locality-disruption attacks to
replace them when new content is added to a full cache
in a timely manner. The extensive analysis satisfies the
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objectives of the experiment and ensure that the pro-
posed ANFIS-based caching for mitigating cache pol-
lution attacks can yield high accuracy as compared to
other methods without very much computational cost.
Future work includes devising several improvements to
the approach presented in this paper and its use in larger
and more complex network topologies.
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